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Uremovic: The Christology of Nestorius of Constantinople

TWO PROSŌPA, ONE PROSŌPON
THE CHRISTOLOGY OF NESTORIUS OF CONSTANTINOPLE
Danijel Uremović

Introduction

The episode of Nestorius versus Cyril is well known to students of early Church history.
The controversy centred around the enumeration of persons in the Incarnate Christ, with the
popular account ascribing a duality of persons to the thought of Nestorius. The Council, under
the heavy hand of Cyril, rightly condemned this view. 1 It will be our purpose here, however,
to establish the accuracy of this long and oft-unquestioned history. We will begin with an
overview of the controversy and its central themes. Following, we will identify the cardinal
terms of the debate and seek to establish their meaning according to Nestorius. From here, we
will attempt to systematise these findings and seek an answer to the question “was Nestorius,
Nestorian?”

Overview of the Problem

The happenings at Ephesus begin less as a Christological issue than as a Marian one.
The appellation Theotokos (God-bearer) became the touchstone of the discussion, as the
competing Antiochene and Alexandrian schools sought an answer to the question “to whom
(or what) did the Virgin Mary give birth?”2 Quickly the exchange turned to a Christological
problem, whence the popular presentation of Nestorius’ two-person Christology. This portrait
usually goes on to suggest that Nestorius believed in two Sons, and that their union was
basically a “moral” union – a harmony of either person’s will with the other.3 Appropriately,
this position was condemned by Cyril and the Council of Ephesus. Aside from the popular
1

Norman P. Tanner, ed. Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils (London: Sheed and Ward, 1990), 61-62.
Charles Joseph Hefele, A History of the Council of the Church from the Original Documents vol. III (Edinburgh:
T & T Clark, 1883), 13.
3
Beginning, of course, with Cyril. His initial correction of Nestorius, for example, reveals a reading or suspicion
(“[f]or I do not greatly trust the documents being circulated” Letter 2 in Letters 1-50, trans. by John I. McEnerney
(Washington DC: CUA Press, 1987), 34) of Nestorius’ Christology as bi-personal (see Letter 4 in Letters 1-50,
41). Modern examples can be seen in Bedjan (whose assessment of Nestorius concerning the Incarnation flirts
with our own conclusions, despite ultimately dismissing the presence of any real union in Nestorius’ Christology),
Jugie and Relton. Carl E. Braaten, “Modern Interpretations of Nestorius” Church History 32, no. 3 (1963): 5, 10.
2
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historical retelling, however, there is the current scholarly context which permits our review of
Nestorius’ theology. The (relatively) recent discovery of a more sizable work by the heresiarch4
has since invited a considerable deal of scholarship,5 with many revising what was thitherto
the consensus.6 Before engaging with certain of these interpretations, however, we do well to
consider the basic terms that Nestorius adopts in his explication of the incarnational union.7
Nestorius’ Christology

i.

Clarifying Terms.
Given how frequently theological controversy has been shown reducible to concerns of

language, it is sensible to consider the key terms of Nestorius’ Christology. His lexicon is
notoriously confusing. Against his contemporaries and others in the lengthier tradition before
him, his words often assume unlike meanings.8 Even within his own work apparent
inconsistencies may be noted. Bethune-Baker relates some of these key terms with their Greek
and Syriac equivalents as such:9

4

Namely, The Book or Bazaar of Heracleides. Nestorius, Liber Heraclidis, trans. F. Nau, P. Bedjan, ed., (Leipzig
and Paris, 1910); as well as the English translation, The Bazaar of Heraclides. G. R. Driver and L. Hodgson
(Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2002). All citations of Nestorius from this work will be taken from the English edition,
hereafter Bazaar. Concerning the authenticity of parts of the text, see Roberta C. Chesnut, “The Two Prosopa in
Nestorius’ ‘Bazaar of Heracleides’” The Journal of Theological Studies 29, no. 2 (October 1978): 392-398 and
Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition: From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451), trans. John Bowden
(London: Mowbrays, 1975), 501-504. The bulk of our study will draw from the pages of the Bazaar beyond the
opening dialogue, despite the good reasons to accept its authenticity.
5
For a concise presentation of the major positions in modern Nestorian scholarship, see Braaten, “Modern
Interpretations of Nestorius,” 251-267. The catalogue of authors is not exhaustive and is today outdated. However,
the authors presented are representative of the key positions, and are more or less the voices guiding all
contemporary studies.
6
Consequent of the limited data. For the available sources of Nestorius scholarship, consult John McGuckin, Saint
Cyril of Alexandria and the Christological Controversy (New York: Saint Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2004), 126130.
7
Despite the markedly philosophical terms of the debate must be understood as the ancillae to Nestorius’ and
Cyril’s theological purposes. Both, in some way, took up a metaphysics to expound their views. Nestorius (and
Cyril, undoubtedly) drew heavily from the scriptures, with the systems of classical learning serving only to clarify
what was already contained in Revelation. Nestorius’ Bazaar is replete with scriptural insights (consider, for
example, his interpretation of Philippians 2; Bazaar, 164-166, 207.), and so the reader should not allow the coming
speculation and abstraction to undermine Nestorius’ efforts as a genuinely scriptural thinker. For the question of
Nestorius’ metaphysics see Friedrich Loofs, Nestorius and His Place in the History of Christian Doctrine
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914) and Hodgson, “The Metaphysics of Nestorius” The Journal of
Theological Studies 19, no. 73 (1917): 46-55.
8
For a concise presentation of this in the case of prosōpon, see Driver and Hodgson, Appendix III to Bazaar, 402410.
9
J. F. Bethune-Baker, Nestorius and His Teaching: A Fresh Examination of the Evidence (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1908), 47-50, 54. McGuckin, Grillmeier, and Hodgson, propose the four terms as the heart of
the controversy – the four basic levels of any metaphysical analysis. Hodgson groups ousia and hypostasis, thereby
counting three realities. See McGuckin, Saint Cyril of Alexandria, 138; Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition,
456; Hodgson, Appendix IV to Bazaar, 412-414.
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person, etc.10

prosōpon

parṣōpā

substance11

ousia, hypostasis

q’nōmā

nature12

physis

k’yānā

One may, of course, pick up on other technical terms as, say, schema (“appearance” or
“form”)13 or idiomata (“properties”).14 These, however, are shown to be more or less reducible
to other terms. Again, though less a term than a concept, one ought to count “union” among
the key pieces of Nestorius’ Christology. The difficulty, as we shall see, lies not only in the
familiar problem of diverse meanings, but also in diverse language. 15 In any case, this core
As we shall see, the term prosōpon has been various translated as “person,” “appearance” (Loofs), “personality”
(Bethune-Baker), “image” (Chestnut), “function” (provided and rejected by Bethune-Baker), “external aspect”
(Kyle, McGuckin). See Friedrich Loofs, Nestorius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914), 76-77, 79;
Chesnut, c 399; Bethune-Baker, Nestorius and His Teaching, 51; Richard Kyle, ''Nestorius: The Partial
Rehabilitation of a Heretic'' Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 32.1 (1989): 79; McGuckin, Saint
Cyril of Alexandria, 144. We will here maintain the Greek transliteration prosōpon to the end of avoiding any
unnuanced or wanting translation. Concerning this and other technical terms and their English translations, we
ought to be mindful of the final form and definition these took in the Scholastic synthesis and preceding conciliar
developments (e.g. the Latin substantia, although a calque of the Greek hypostasis, serves as the popular
translation for ousia, with hypostasis frequently reserved for its peculiar theological meaning of Person). We opt
for the translations given here (save for “person”), as they best accord with modern theological-philosophical
convention (even if such convention is itself not absolute).
11
That is, the concrete existence of a particular thing, qua its numerical identity. Corresponds to the Latin
substantia or essentia. Kyle appears to separate the two terms (hypostasis and ousia) as distinct categories, though
his understanding of Nestorius’ metaphysics is generally rather confused, even if his final assessment will accord
with our own (see Kyle, ''Nestorius,” 82). Despite the distinction (if Kyle really regards one), this separate level
of being rests safely between the concrete individual substance (at the bottom) and the phenomenal reality and
attributes (up top), such that no injury is done to our reading of Nestorius, who simply seeks to posit these layers
of being as necessarily opposed to their corresponding realities (i.e. this substance is not that substance, etc.). This
ontological division will become clearer in due course (see fig. 1 and 2 on pages 7 and 9 respectively).
12
Loofs, with Bethune-Baker, understands nature as the set of attributes proper to a substance. See Loofs,
Nestorius, 66; and Bethune-Baker, Nestorius and His Teaching, 48.
13
Driver and Hodgson further qualify this as a “form or appearance of a thing at any given moment,” with multiple
schemata unified as a prosōpon (as H2O would underlie the schemata of ice and running water in their example).
Driver and Hodgson, Bazaar, 15 fn. 2. See also Kyle, “Nestorius, ” 80 fn. 33. This temporal qualification may
serve to distinguish schema from one sense of prosōpon. Chesnut, by contrast, suggests both terms (schema and
prosōpon) to be practical synonyms. Chesnut, “The Two Prosopa in Nestorius,” 406-407.
14
Corresponds to nature, as schema to prosōpon. Schemata and idiomata be perhaps be better distinguished per a
static – dynamic distinction. Various idiomata and schemata make up a given nature and prosōpon respectively,
with the idiomata comprising the definitional content of a nature, and the schemata constituting the dynamic
operations of a prosōpon. A union of natures would constitute a conjunction of essential idiomata. Analogously,
a union of prosōpa would be realised as a conjunction of these schematic attributes. As 1, 2 and 3 are all of the
category “number,” and as 3 is the sum of 1 and 2, the conjunction of two numbers produces yet one number. This
numerical device works inasmuch as it reveals the category “number” (like prosōpon) to be open to a conjunction
of other numbers while remaining the same sort of thing. Such is (theoretically and in a qualified sense) true of
nature, although the idiomata that define either nature in Christ are such that their conjunction would entail a
contradiction in the resultant nature.
15
As far as meanings are concerned, the function of prosōpon remains the central puzzle of our inquiry. Diverse
language denoting the same or similar concept, on the other hand, is found throughout, although one may cite the
notion of “union” as especially problematic.
10
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lexicon suffices for the commencement of our inquiry into Nestorius. None of their meanings
may be gained in isolation through a purely historical or etymological examination of the
Greek/Syriac usage. Rather, they must be ascertained against the internal evidence and the use
of such terms in relation to one another. As such, let us consider Nestorius’ use of these central
terms.

ii.

Ousia and Hypostasis
The philosophical categories of ousia and hypostasis were both in classical thought and

Nestorius’ system largely interchangeable.16 Either term served to point out an individual
concrete reality. As time went on hypostasis assumed another sense that tends closer to our
modern conception of “person.”17 Since hypostasis (with ousia) traditionally signified a
particular individual substance, it was the placement of emphasis that would ultimately
determine its meaning in a given context.18 For Nestorius, such emphasis fell on the numerical
identity of a substance. His criticism of nature divorced from hypostasis confirms this reading:
“the natures are not without hypostases, nor in idea without the hypostases of the natures do
they constitute [them] by sayings in reflection.”19 What this means for Nestorius is that the
definitional content of a nature must have a real grounding in a being, lest the Incarnation be
reducible to a façade. As such, we may content ourselves here with the translation of hypostasis
as substance, properly qualified.

iii.

Physis
If hypostasis and ousia in their conventional use point out an individual substance,

physis or nature serves to establish its identity, providing a what to a that. The divine and human
substances are numerically separate, as are all substances. It is their coupling with, and

16

Loofs, Nestorius, 71. As is noted, Nestorius opted more frequently for hypostasis than ousia in reference to
Christ (Bethune-Baker, Nestorius and His Teaching, 49). Nevertheless, Nestorius is aware of the newer sense of
hypostasis (Nestorius, Bazaar, 412; Bethune-Baker, Nestorius and His Teaching 50). For a puzzling instance of
the terms taking different meanings, see Nestorius, Bazaar, 234, fn. 4.
17
Such that hypostasis could serve the psychological function of a person’s individual core. Bethune-Baker also
provides the other sense of “person” that hypostasis carries in the theological context. He states: “The word
[hypostasis] had been narrowed down from its wider meaning ‘substance’ and forced to do duty for the conception
of the particular ‘modes of existence’ of the one God with constituted God a Trinity.” Bethune-Baker, Nestorius,
50.
18
Namely on either the qualitative or quantitative distinctiveness of a given substance. For this reason, we may
speak of the Godhead’s common hypostasis (the divine essence), although it is more common these days to regard
the divine Persons as three hypostases. See, for example, Jerome’s letter to Damasus, where he permits either use
of the term when properly qualified; Jerome, Epistle XV (PL 22, 355-358). Note also his remark about the
historical usage of hypostasis in classical learning.
19
Nestorius, Bazaar, 322.
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inevitable assumption of, a proper nature that makes the discussion of union possible as well
as problematic. We mentioned above the idea of nature as a collection of properties or
attributes.20 It is these properties that are “combined for the competition of a nature.”21 “[T]he
[properties] of the nature are definite”

22

writes Nestorius, such that Christ’s Incarnation

demands that “he ha[ve] according to nature all [the properties] of a man.”23

iv.

Prosōpon
Despite the popular portrait of his two-person Christology, Nestorius is seen to speak

more of a single prosōpon than of two prosōpa.24 Aside from this numerical discrepancy, there
is the added temptation of rendering prosōpon as “person,” despite the fact that it fits neither
the traditional meanings of classical Greek, nor Nestorius’ own usage. Among these traditional
translations we find “face, visage, countenance… mask, dramatic part, or character… outward
appearance, beauty.”25 Any association with person is “always… as regarded from the outside,
not the inner ego.”26 For Nestorius’ purposes, certain of these translations better reflect his
thought (perhaps “countenance” or “outward appearance”), yet none of them seems to arrive
at his intention perfectly. Chesnut counts three senses to his technical use of prosōpon, which
are worth considering.27 At times prosōpon serves [1] to relate a function of the will. At other
times it [2] carries the idea of “activity or operation.” In this way none “of the prophets nor of
the angels [has] been seen to make use of the prosōpon of God.”28 Christ, by contrast, made
use of “all the operations of his prosōpon.”29 Finally, according to Chestnut, it bears [3]
revelatory significance: “[T]he prosōpon [makes known] the ousia”30 such that one ought not
to consider “the prosōpa without the hypostasis and… the ousia”31 inasmuch as “the prosōpon
exists not without the ousia.”32 This third function of prosōpon accords especially with the

20

Supra, fn 11.
Nestorius, Bazaar, 35
22
Nestorius, Bazaar, 36.
23
Nestorius, Bazaar, 35.
24
Loofs, Nestorius, 78-79. Note his critique of Bethune-Baker’s claim (Bethune-Baker, Nestorius and His
Teaching, 49) concerning the occurrences of prosōpon/prosōpa. According to Loofs, the preference for two
prosōpa (over the singular form) is not as infrequent as Bethune-Baker may lead the reader to think.
25
Appendix III in Bazaar, 402
26
Appendix III in Bazaar, 402.
27
Chestnut, “The Two Prosopa in Nestorius,” 406-406.
28
Nestorius, Bazaar, 52. Being inspired by God, they do not act in his prosōpon, so as to warrant an identification
of their act with God’s. Any mention of God acting in them is necessarily in a more remote sense than the
Christological instance.
29
Nestorius, Bazaar, 147.
30
Nestorius, Bazaar, 158.
31
Nestorius, Bazaar, 228.
32
Nestorius, Bazaar, 170.
21
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proposed translation of “appearance,” although the broader philosophical understanding of act
can perhaps serve to harmonise all three of these otherwise unrelated notions.33

v.

Henōsis, synapheia and other senses of “union”
The Nestorian controversy considers the incarnational union on several different levels.

We have, first of all, the textbook dichotomy of a moral or voluntary union (Nestorius’ “henōsis
kat’ eudokian”)34 against a hypostatic union (Cyril’s “henōsis kath’ hypostasin”).35 In addition
to this pairing, Nestorius also spoke in terms of a prosopic union, with the further nuance of a
“physical” union as either [1] natural or [2] of nature.36 Again, there is the generic descriptor
of “conjunction” (synapheia), which also deserves consideration. Let us begin with the natural
– of nature division, and thereby consider the subsequent formulations of union.
A union of nature considers the question as one of location, identifying where in Christ
exists union and opposition. Quite unanimously, Nestorius is taken to defend a union of
prosōpon, upholding an opposition on the levels of nature and substance. We may represent
the prosopic union against the other ontological strata of opposition and division thus:

33

The classical notion of act is here useful to consider. By it, one may well understand acts as the products of
efficient causes, but even more broadly, consider them less in the way of busy occurrences, e.g. as a phenomenal
appearance (a substance’s act of self-disclosure) or “the act of being.” As we shall see, it is this extensive exchange
of functions – rooted in either nature – that characterise the prosopic union as something unconfused, yet
metaphysically grounded. Any mention of appearance, especially in reference to the divine should be read in this
sense, so as to encompass all aspects of Christ’s acting, not merely the sensible appearances nor the agent at work.
34
As in J. Mark Armitage, A Twofold Solidarity: Leo the Great’s Theology of Redemption (Strathfield: St Pauls,
2005), 133.
35
Bethune-Baker, Nestorius and His Teaching, 91.
36
Again, granting ear to Cyril’s less than clear language. Nestorius, Bazaar, 86.
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fig 1. Levels of Union and Opposition in Christ
Hypostasis

Divine substance37

Jesus’ humanity

Nature

Divine nature

Human nature

Idiomata

Various features of “divinity” that
define God

Various features of “humanity” that
define man

Natural
prosōpa

Divine appearance

Human appearance

Schemata

Various attributes, states or function
of the divine

Various attributes, states or function
of human nature

Prosōpon of Single historical appearance/unity/subject – the Word made flesh, with either
the union
nature’s catalogue of attributes, powers, etc. brought together
Schemata

Various attributes, etc. of God and man brought together.

Recalling Nestorius’ peculiar use of prosōpa (not as persons, but attributes,
appearances, functions), we may begin to harmonise the single and dual formulations of
Christ’s prosōpon/prosōpa. Are they to be counted as one, two or three? In varying ways, all
are fair enumerations. In the dual it denotes the phenomenal manifestation proper to either
nature, what Loofs thinks Nestorius would ascribe to everything.38 Both the divine and the
human retain their proper “appearances” or set of “operations”. In a single prosōpon then, we
should recognise Nestorius’ commitment to a unified Christ as the historical meeting-place of
God and man. If either prosōpon is taken as the accumulation of various schemata, the
conjunction of two schematic listings can be seen to constitute a new prosōpon. Reserving this
conjunction to the prosopic level, Nestorius avoids any metaphysical confusion: proper
attributes are preserved and no tertium quid arises as a result. The exchange of prosopic
attributes occurs around one unified object of revelation – Christ. God, prior to the Incarnation,
had no human appearance or prosōpon. A man who is not himself God cannot be spoken of as
having a divine appearance – such is proper to God alone. In this way, prosōpon may be
understood as providing a weaker label for the historical fact of the God-man, saying less in
the way of either nature or substance’s association with the other. As such, this reading is
Modern sensibilities would provide “Logos” or a similar designation to the hypostatic level on the side of
divinity. Given the evidence, (e.g. Nestorius, Bazaar, ) we may reasonably opt for this identification of the divine
substance with hypostasis, granting the consequent lack of a personal core in Nestorius’ system. Our later
discussion will address this. For our current purpose, it does not affect Nestorius’ case for the prosopic union.
38
That is, as something impersonal, lest all existents be regarded as having their own person.
37
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favoured as being the only one that may consistently uphold the singular and dual numberings
of prosōpa, without affirming a contradiction39 or surrendering any one of Nestorius’
theological commitments.
Having explored the local question concerning the union (of nature), let us consider its
related modal problem (natural). Nestorius’ prosopic union, aside from avoiding metaphysical
complications also seeks to preserve the divine freedom proper to God. If Cyril’s hypostatic
union warrants the fear of a tertium quid in the historical Jesus, it then raises the like concern
in the immanent life of God. Contradictions then follow: God is made something other than
God; he is shown to be mutable; he is driven to action by creatures. Escaping these conclusions
permits a fresh understanding of the simplistic moral union familiar to us. Far from a mere
harmony of two distinct wills, the voluntary union signifies the free ordaining of God’s good
will. By this, the union kat’ eudokian illumines the right metaphysical union kata prosōpon.
Bethune-Baker confirms this reading when he writes:40

[T]he term [eudokia] is used to safeguard the voluntariness of the
condescension by which He who was God became man. God the Word of
His own good pleasure becomes incarnate... [it] is the outcome and free and
unconstrained expression of God's love for man: remaining what He is in
being and in nature, he takes to Himself in the Person of the Word the being
and nature of man.
In Nestorius’ thought, a natural union implies a prior sustaining cause. Thus, a natural union,
aside from imposing on divine freedom, would itself demand an explanatory cause. It is only
in the mode of volition that one can account for an unconfused union.
Finally, it behoves us to give brief mention of the final expression in Nestorius
surrounding union: synapheia. Generally rendered as “conjunction,” it has often been rejected
as a problematically weak descriptor for the incarnational union. Other translations (“contact”
or “cohesion”)41 have been offered, alongside the fact that mention of henōsis (a markedly

39

And even then, we might count this as a shortcoming of his reasoning rather than his intentions. See H. E. W.
Turner, ''Nestorius Reconsidered'', Studia Patristica 13 (1975): 321.
40
Bethune-Baker, Nestorius and His Teaching, 94. Admittedly, this theme in Nestorius is seldom addressed in
the available literature, and to no great depth. Nevertheless, I take the positing of the question against Cyril’s
hypostatic formula, Nestorius’ own admission of puzzlement, and further textual evidence to reveal this
understanding of “good will” as a key point of Nestorius’ Christology, and accordingly, an area demanding greater
research. See Nestorius, Bazaar, 36-41,178-179.
41
Bethune-Baker, Nestorius, 90-91. Bethune-Baker also provides the point that the synapheia – henōsis
dichotomy is, to the mind of Nestorius, a false one.
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stronger expression) outnumbers that of conjunction.42 One should here note the role that
ancient scientific categories played in directing Nestorius’ pen toward the apparently weaker
“conjunction.” Classical learning provided various classes of change and production.43
Conscious of the problems their export beyond the natural sciences would bear, Nestorius’ opts
for a distinct label in discussing the Incarnation. Though far from any natural scientific inquiry,
one can yet see how the proclivity of stronger phraseology to misunderstanding made the
Nestorian formulations inevitable.44 Even with this scruple in mind, Nestorius’ synapheia
cannot be dismissed as a merely nominal union. As Bethune-Baker notes, this same conjunction
informs the Nestorian speech of either nature’s glorification in the single Christ.45

vi.

Situating Nestorius
Having considered the basic themes in Nestorius, and having proposed a right

understanding of the same, we find ourselves in the position to schematise his Christology,
according to the central concepts he employs, before assessing the extent to which Nestorius
was Nestorian. Let us structure the above divisions once more, in light of our discussion of
union.

Human attributes

Human Physis

Single
historical prosōpon

Human Hypostasis

Divine Prosōpon

Divine Physis

Divine Hypostasis

Divine attributes

Human Prosōpon

fig. 2 Exchange of Prosopic Attributes

→Prosopic union←
←Opposition of substance→
←Opposition of nature→
42

Mark Dickens, ''Nestorius Did Not Intend to Argue That Christ Had a Dual Nature, but That View Became
Labeled Nestorianism” in Popular Controversies in World History: Investigating History’s Intriguing Questions,
Steven Laurence Danver, ed., (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 156.
43
As in krasis, mixis or sygchysis. Bethune-Baker, Nestorius and His Teaching, 91. Nestorius’ awareness of such
divisions of combination is evident when he writes: “Neither by mixture and confusion nor by a change of ousia,
nor again by a natural change of composition of the humanity, is he conceived.” Nestorius, Bazaar, 220. Cf. 171.
44
Viz. the misunderstanding which he recognised as the chief deficiency of a hypostatic union – a confusion of
natures, human and divine, into something distinct. Nestorius, Bazaar, 327.
45
Bethune-Baker, Nestorius and His Teaching, 91.
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The diagram echoes the basic point of the preceding representation, namely that there exists
one sphere of union alone – the prosopic – with the substantial and essential domains of
hypostasis and nature being necessarily opposed. It supplies, however, an understanding of the
various attributes in either prosōpa as mutually related through a union of exchange and
conjunction. Either prosōpon makes use of the other,46 with their mutual orientation about the
single pole of Christ Incarnate constituting the grounds of their union.47
Where then ought one to place Nestorius? Despite the shared lexicon of Cyril, Nestorius
and the greater tradition, we have seen the key terms to be met with considerably nuanced, if
not wholly divergent, meanings. Even internally these terms were confused, most especially in
the ambiguous prosōpon, further muddled by its irregular numerical predication. Be that as it
may, Nestorius employed greater consistency than Cyril in his use of technical terms and was
able to expound his metaphysics of the Incarnation more clearly.48 We saw his view to be very
much compatible with orthodox faith, insofar as his commitment to true and complete natures
(fully God, fully man), a single unified subject (a single Person in Christ), and a mutual use of
attributes (something akin to a communicatio idiomatum)49 formed the touchstone of his
Christology. In addition to this, a methodological strength is to be found in Nestorius. Recalling
the revelatory function of the single prosōpon, Nestorius establishes Christ as the means to the
Father,50 the single source of revelation,51 and the unified object of our faith and adoration,52
“begin[ning not] from God the Word… but from him from whom the fathers began”53 – a
bottom-up movement appreciative of the divine initiative, and personal nature, of Christian
Revelation.54 Following all this, Christokos (the catalyst of this entire controversy) assumes an
orthodox sense, emphasising the incarnational union without any confusion of nature. 55 Christ
qua God has no mother, and it is with this understanding in mind that Nestorius rejects the title
of Theotokos. Phrased another way, Theotokos or anthrōpotokos (in Nestorius’ mind) make

46

Nestorius, Bazaar, 207.
Nestorius, Bazaar, 237-238. The confusion of pronouns may seem to push Nestorius to familiar Nestorianism.
Yet, this apparent duplication of persons is resolved when one notes the contextual reference to the humanity as
to “flesh” i.e. something impersonal, but not aprosopic – in turn affirming our establishes reading of prosōpon.
48
Bethune-Baker, Nestorius and His Teaching, 53.
49
A suggestion echoed in Turner as a communicatio prosōpōn.
50
In both an epistemic and soteriological way, with certain of Christ’s schematic operations making known the
prosōpon of God.
51
“…with a view to revelation he carried out all the operations of his prosōpon.” Nestorius, Bazaar, 147.
52
Nestorius, Bazaar, 61, 220-221, 238, 312-313.
53
Nestorius, Bazaar, 146. Cf. 153, 171.
54
Against Armitage’s critique of a static Christology. Armitage, A Twofold Solidarity, 115.
55
For “[o]ne indeed is the name [Christ] which indicates two [natures].” Nestorius, Bazaar, 209.
47
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reference to either one of the distinct prosōpa in Christ.56 It is Christokos that speaks of the
entire incarnational reality, of the historical prosōpon of the union.57
There are, however, serious features lacking in his Christology. Even if the system, as
we have explained it here, is defensible as consistent and orthodox, it fails to locate clearly a
personal core or subject of the Incarnation. If the two prosōpa, as collections of attributes,
powers and appearances, form one prosōpon only as through conjunction, one may rightly
question the reality or depth of this union. Cyril’s Christology locates the personal centre of
consciousness in the divine hypostasis. It does, however, risk either a confusion of essence or
a metaphysically empty notion of hypostasis, void of any qualitative content.58 The benefit of
Nestorius’ answer is that it avoids these complications, with his wanting identification of a
personal core being easily resolved by supplying or further dividing terms.59
Was Nestorius then a Nestorian? Understanding Nestorianism as a commitment to a bipersonal Christology, our examination of the Bazaar would suggest an answer in the negative.
The unique meaning of prosōpon in Nestorius evades any doubling of personal subjects and
thus redeems the widely misunderstood notion of a moral or voluntary union. His commitments
to substantial and essential distinctiveness, the unity of Christ, and the primacy of the Word
Incarnate as the way to the Father are all admirable foci of a sound Christology. Turner classes
Nestorius’ shortcoming as having complicated otherwise sound convictions through confused
theorising.60 Whether the confusion lay in his thought or its critics is a separate concern. What
our findings have shown is that the Nestorius of the Bazaar remained committed to the basic
tenets of orthodox Christianity, even if their theological reconciliation came short of a complete
and perfect synthesis, and the rulings of Ephesus ultimately fell against him.61

Loofs recognises some degree of acceptance of Theotokos in Nestorius. Nevertheless, Nestorius’ preference
falls on Christokos, accepting “God-bearer” only when coupled and contrasted with “man-bearer.” Loofs,
Nestorius, 28. Nestorius, Bazaar, 99, 148, 185, 193, 387.
57
Nestorius reasons with the scriptural idiom in mind. The biblical descriptor of “Christ” (or Son or Lord) in
reference to the God-man is taken as denoting the single prosōpon of union, e.g. “Christ was born,” (Matt 1:16,
Bazaar, 99) “born in the flesh, Christ,” (Rom 9:5, Bazaar 99). Or consider his Passion, for which one will “not
find… [in the New Testament] that death is imputed unto God… but unto Christ” (Bazaar, 258, drawing on Rom
5:10 and Heb 1:1-2). Such is the case for Nestorius, who takes “the name of Christ… [to be] indicative of two
natures” (Bazaar, 260).
58
The danger, admittedly, arises when this language is carried over to the Trinity as in Nestorius, Bazaar, 247.
One might understand this less in Modalist terms than regard Nestorius’ conception of Trinitarian prosōpa as a
marker of function relations.
59
The simplest solution to my mind involves the clear and exclusive designation of the confused terms ousia and
hypostasis to distinct items in Christ viz. according to their modern Trinitarian meanings (hypostasis as Person,
ousia as substance or essence). Thus, in the second figure one would substitute hypostasis for an ousia, with
hypostasis (assuming the theological meaning of Person) supplied on the divine side alone.
60
Turner, ''Nestorius Reconsidered'', 321. Also, Kyle, “Nestorius,” 81-83.
61
We have not here entertained the canonical question surrounding Nestorius, raised by the likes of Jugie, who
claims “that [in the question of Nestorius’ orthodoxy] even the doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope is at stake”
56
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